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Keeping Boumediene off the  
Battlefield: Examining Potential  
Implications of the Boumediene v. 
 Bush Decision to the Conduct of  
United States Military Operations 
 
Colonel Fred K. Ford* 
 
I. Boumediene and the Historical Precedent 
 
The Supreme Court of the United States, by its June 2008 
holding in Boumediene v. Bush,1 granted the right of habeas 
corpus to the enemy detainees held by the Department of 
Defense (“DoD”) at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.  This landmark 
ruling granted rights to enemy fighters heretofore foreclosed 
and left open the potential for further extension of rights under 
the laws of the United States to enemy fighters detained 
overseas.  In particular, the Court’s decision has implications 
in two general areas: (1) the application of the habeas right to 
foreign fighters detained in locations other than Guantanamo 
 
* Colonel, U.S. Army Judge Advocate General’s Corps, currently serving 
as the Staff Judge Advocate, Multi-National Security Transition Command-
Iraq, Baghdad, Iraq.  This Essay was written when the author served as a 
Fellow at the Department of Justice and satisfies in part the requirements of 
the U.S. Army War College Fellowship program.  The views expressed are 
those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. 
Army, Department of Justice, or the U.S. Government.  The author wishes to 
thank Pace Law Review editors Joseph Marutollo and Patrick Petrocelli for 
their superb patience and assistance and the members of the Office of the 
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, for their kindness and hospitality 
during the Fellowship academic year and for the professionally enriching 
experience they provided. 
1. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262, 2274 (2008) (holding that 
the Suspension Clause of the U.S. Constitution applies to Guantanamo Bay 
and that congressional attempts to create habeas-like procedures were 
insufficient).  The Suspension Clause states that the habeas writ “shall not be 
suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety 
may require it.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
1
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Bay; and (2) the application of other constitutional and 
statutory rights to persons stopped or detained by U.S. military 
forces during military operations.  While the Court attempted, 
through the use of restrictive language, to limit application of 
the Boumediene decision to Guantanamo Bay, it stopped short 
of explicitly doing so.  As a result, leaders within the DoD may 
be forced to consider Boumediene in planning and waging 
future military operations.  Organizational change, including 
adjustments to policy, structure, and tactics, may be required.  
Additionally, troops on the ground may be forced to operate 
within the confines of Boumediene, figuratively loading their 
already full combat assault packs with the heavy rocks of 
constitutional procedures and protections normally reserved for 
domestic police operations. 
The U.S. military adheres to a historical legal precedent 
and framework regarding the capture and detention of foreign 
enemies engaged in hostilities against the United States.2  Our 
country has a history of engaging in overseas wars, capturing 
prisoners, and holding them in overseas and domestic camps 
controlled by U.S. forces.  Generally, these detainees have been 
entitled to the panoply of legal protections afforded by 
international law, primarily the Geneva Conventions.  
Historically, however, these prisoners and detained persons3 
have not had the right to petition U.S. courts for release when 
they are located outside the country’s borders.  That is, they 
have not enjoyed the right of habeas corpus.  Boumediene 
 
2. See, e.g., Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950); Rasul v. Bush, 
542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
3. Whether termed “enemy combatant,” “detained person,” “prisoner of 
war,” or other title, foreign fighters captured in defense of the nation possess 
some measure of rights under the law and are entitled to an appropriate 
degree of protection and security.  Since Boumediene, an argument can be 
made that the new functional analysis test created by the Court, and 
discussed herein, applies as much to “enemy combatants” as it does to 
traditional prisoners of war who are entitled to the protections of Geneva.  
For a comprehensive pre-Boumediene discussion asserting that labels and 
status do matter, see Geoffrey S. Corn, Enemy Combatants and Access to 
Habeas Corpus: Questioning the Validity of the Prisoner of War Analogy, 5 
SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 2 (2007).  Further, this Essay will not address 
application of Boumediene to other locations where the United States might 
arguably exercise functional control, such as overseas embassies, and 
consulates, and alleged intelligence “black sites.” 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/16
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changed the legal landscape in this area. 
In determining that Guantanamo detainees have the right 
of habeas corpus, the Court appeared to attempt to limit 
application of this new precedent to the unique circumstances 
of Guantanamo Bay.  In its holding, the Court fashioned a new 
test to determine whether a foreign fighter detained overseas 
may rely on the habeas right4 and rejected a de jure 
sovereignty analysis.5  Simply detaining enemy fighters on 
foreign territory is no longer sufficient to prevent application of 
the habeas right.  Instead, the Court held that a petitioning 
foreign enemy detainee held overseas enjoys the right of 
habeas corpus if the United States, though not possessing legal 
sovereignty over the area, maintains functional control over the 
 
4. As discussed infra, the Court indicated its tendency to extend rights 
to the Guantanamo detainees when it decided the case of Rasul v. Bush, 542 
U.S. 466 (2004).  In Rasul, the Court, in a precedential decision, granted the 
petitioning detainees (foreign fighters detained at Guantanamo) statutory 
habeas rights under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006).  Rasul, 542 U.S. at 483.  The 
United States had never previously granted such rights to foreign enemies 
detained overseas.  Attempting to statutorily overrule Rasul, Congress 
passed the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, granting Guantanamo detainees 
the right to a habeas-like procedure.  Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. 
L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680.  Similarly, in 2006, the Court struck down the 
military commissions process established for the prosecution of certain 
Guantanamo Bay detainees.  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 613 (2006).  
In response, Congress passed the Military Commissions Act of 2006, 
establishing new military commissions procedures intended to meet the 
Court’s concerns.  Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 
120 Stat. 2600.  These two cases and the commensurate congressional 
reaction suggest that Congress may yet again legislate in response to 
Boumediene.  This Essay does not address a congressional fix to Boumediene 
but instead focuses on possible implications of Congressional inaction.  In any 
event, Congress has already shown an interest in the Boumediene decision.  
See, e.g., MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., BOUMEDIENE V. 
BUSH: GUANTANAMO DETAINEES’ RIGHT TO HABEAS CORPUS 11 (2008), available 
at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34536.pdf (noting that “Boumediene did not 
necessarily bar all legislation” responsive to the ruling).  For a discussion of 
some measures Congress could take to alleviate Boumediene‟s impact, see 
Implications of the Supreme Court‟s Boumediene v. Bush Decision for 
Detainees at Guantanamo Bay: Before the H. Armed Services Comm., 110th 
Cong. (2008) (opening statement of Daniel J. Dell’Orto, Acting General 
Counsel, Department of Defense), available at 
http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/FC073108/DellOrto_Testimony073108.pd
f. 
5. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2253. 
3
2010]KEEPING BOUMEDIENE OFF THE BATTLEFIELD 399 
 
 
prisoner.6  In order to determine whether the United States 
maintains functional control, the Court rejected the traditional 
black-and-white analysis of legal sovereignty and adopted a 
more nuanced test.7  Under the new test, a court reviews the 
“objective factors and practical concerns” associated with the 
detention to determine whether the United States exercises 
functional control over the detained enemy fighter.8 
 In the case of Guantanamo Bay, the Court pointed out that 
an indefinite lease with the Cuban government affords the 
United States an unprecedented amount of autonomy.9   Using 
the phrase “total military and civil control,”10 the Court 
reasoned, in essence, that the United States possessed de facto 
sovereignty over the territory.11  The Court considered 
“objective factors and practical concerns” in conducting its 
functional analysis and in determining that the United States 
maintained functional control over the detainees.12 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia, in their 
dissenting opinions, criticized the majority for overstepping its 
bounds in granting these new rights.13  Each pointed out 
possible problems with or repercussions from the decision.14 
Justice Scalia devoted attention to what he termed the 
“disastrous consequences” of the majority opinion.15  He 
cautioned that the holding “will almost certainly cause more 
 
6. Id. at 2262. 
7. Id. at 2258. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. at 2251-52.  See also Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval 
Stations, Feb. 23, 1903, U.S.-Cuba, T.S. No. 418, Art. III. 
10. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2248. 
11. Id. at 2253.  For a detailed discussion of Boumediene and the concept 
of de facto sovereignty, see Anthony J. Colangelo, “De Facto Sovereignty”: 
Boumediene and Beyond, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 623, 627-32, 662-69 (2009) 
(opining that the de facto sovereignty the Court found at Guantanamo likely 
exists nowhere else in the world). 
12. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2258.  For another analysis of 
Boumediene, see Comment, Extraterritorial Reach of Writ of Habeas Corpus, 
122 HARV. L. REV. 395 (2008). 
13. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2279-93 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 
2293-2307 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
14. See, e.g., id. at 2279 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2295 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
15. Id. at 2294 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/16
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Americans to be killed”16 and concluded that “[t]he Nation will 
live to regret what the Court has done today.”17  Justice Scalia 
pointed to evidence showing that, of the detainees that the DoD 
has released from Guantanamo, approximately 30 have 
returned to the battlefield.18  He argued that this data 
“illustrates the incredible difficulty of assessing who is and who 
is not an enemy combatant in a foreign theater of operations 
where the environment does not lend itself to rigorous evidence 
collection.”19  Essentially, Justice Scalia argued that the 
military, rather than the courts, is in the best position to 
determine friend or foe.20  If the DoD in fact released terrorists 
inadvertently, under procedures the Court determined were 
inadequate to protect the detainees, then the heightened 
review, as now mandated by the Court, would doubtless result 
in the release, back to the battlefield, of even more terrorists 
who feign false imprisonment as innocent bystanders. 
Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts expressed 
additional concerns about providing detainees access to U.S. 
military witnesses, who may be otherwise unavailable, at war 
in a combat zone.21  They also resisted releasing classified 
information to detainee counsel, which could be used against 
U.S. forces or to the advantage of the terrorist enemy.22  Noting 
that the DoD relied on previous Court decisions, namely 
Eisentrager,23 in moving detainees all the way from 
Afghanistan to Cuba, Justice Scalia chastised the majority for 
essentially changing the rules in the middle of the war.24  
Concluding his discussion of the decision’s consequences, he 
warned that “how to handle enemy prisoners in this war will 
ultimately lie with the branch that knows least about the 
 
16. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
17. Id. at 2307 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
18. Id. at 2294-95 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
19. Id. at 2295 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
20. Id. at 2295-96 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
21. Id. at 2295 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
22. Id. at 2288 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
23. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (holding that habeas did 
not attach for alien war criminals detained by U.S. forces in Germany). 
24. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2296 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
5
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national security concerns that the subjects entails.”25 
The Boumediene dissenters raise an issue that has 
slithered into today’s modern battlefield and one that must be 
confronted by national security policy makers: lawfare.  
Lawfare is the concept that the current enemy, or any enemy 
for that matter, will use our laws and general compliance with 
the Rule of Law against us.  The term was coined in 2001 by 
then-Colonel, now Major General, Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., of the 
U.S. Air Force, in an article questioning whether lawfare 
undercuts the effectiveness of the military.26  The Boumediene 
dissenters would likely argue that it does.  More significantly, 
Boumediene could be described as a form of fratricide—self-
imposed, self-perpetuating lawfare. 
Will the concerns of the dissenters be realized?  Is the 
majority opinion an attempt by the Court to structure a remedy 
applicable only to Guantanamo Bay, perhaps in order to make 
a political statement or rectify a perceived particularized 
wrong?  Regardless of the answers, the fact remains that the 
decision provides a precedential framework for analysis.  The 
Court must be taken at its word.  In its holding, the Court 
fashioned a new test for determining whether a foreign fighter 
detained overseas may rely on the habeas right.27  In applying 
this test, a subsequent court could conceivably determine that 
the United States exercises functional control over a U.S. 
prisoner of war holding or detention camp located in a foreign 
area, particularly where the area is a traditional Occupied 
Territory under the laws of war—where U.S and/or coalition 
forces are the occupiers.  For some of the practical reasons and 
obstacles described herein, Boumediene should not be 
extended. 
Under Boumediene, did prisoners held at Abu Ghraib 
 
25. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
26. Col. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Law and Military Interventions: 
Preserving Humanitarian Values in 21st Century Conflicts (unpublished 
working paper), available at 
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/cchrp/Web%20Working%20Papers/Use%20of%2
0Force/Dunlap2001.pdf.  For a recent analysis of the rise of lawfare as a legal 
concept, see Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Lawfare: A Decisive Element of 21st 
Century Conflicts?, 54 JOINT FORCE Q. 34 (2009). 
27. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2258. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/16
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during the height of the United States’ occupation of Iraq 
possess habeas rights?28  Does habeas attach to the prisoners 
currently held in overseas locations, such as Bagram Air Base 
in Afghanistan?29  Notwithstanding current restrictions on the 
use of certain areas for military purposes, what if the United 
States chose to establish a Guantanamo Bay-like location in 
Antarctica, or in space?  Or in the middle of an ocean, on a 
ship, or on a man-made island?  The questions are fair ones, 
and some are already being asked by commentators. 
To many who have followed the Court’s decisions in this 
area, the holding is no surprise.  Boumediene reinforced a 
position the Court began to signal a few years earlier.  In 2004, 
in Rasul v. Bush, the Court found that the statutory habeas 
corpus provisions contained in the U.S. Code30 applied to the 
Guantanamo detainees.31  And, in deciding Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld in 2006, the Court applied Geneva Convention 
protections to the Guantanamo detainees.32  Will this trend by 
the Court of providing rights to detained foreign fighters 
continue?  Referring to Boumediene, former Attorney General 
Michael Mukasey expressed concern that the trend could 
continue when he warned that our wartime efforts in 
Afghanistan could become an evidentiary nightmare and turn 
into CSI: Kandahar.33  With this in mind, what measures could 
 
28. On the same day Boumediene was decided, the Supreme Court ruled 
that U.S. citizens detained in Iraq have habeas rights.  Munaf v. Geren, 128 
S. Ct. 2207 (2008). 
29. This is not a theoretical question.  Judge John Bates of the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia held that Boumediene applied to 
three non-Afghani foreign fighters detained by coalition forces at the Theater 
Internment Facility in Bagram, Afghanistan.  Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. 
Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. 2009).  The United States is appealing the decision.  See 
Motion for Certification of this Court’s April 2, 2009 Order for Interlocutory 
Appeal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and for a Stay of Proceedings 
Pending Appeal, Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 
06 Civ. 1669), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/ 
2009/04/us-bagram-appeal-filling-4-10-09.pdf. 
30. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (2006). 
31. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 481-84 (2004). 
32. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 629-33 (2006). 
33. Michael B. Mukasey, Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Remarks at the Meeting of the American Enterprise Institute for Public 
Policy Research (July 21, 2008), available at 
7
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the DoD undertake? 
 
II. Boumediene in the Pentagon 
 
The scope of the problem the DoD may face is a bit 
daunting.  What could happen—and, in the case of the 
Guantanamo detainees, what is happening—is that foreign 
detainees held by U.S. forces in locations deemed to be the 
functional equivalent of United States territory could be 
entitled not just to Geneva protections (for prisoners of war) or 
Detainee Treatment Act34 protections (in the case of enemy 
combatants at Guantanamo Bay not declared prisoners of war), 
but also to habeas review by a federal district court.  If the 
functional analysis test of Boumediene is extended, or is 
interpreted by the DoD to extend to physical locations other 
than Guantanamo, then foreign fighters will be afforded 
additional protections under the U.S. Constitution and U.S. 
laws—protections normally reserved for U.S. citizens or other 
persons in the country.35 
These new rights could include a right to counsel, Miranda 
warnings, heightened due process, and countless other rights 
and privileges normally associated with citizenship or presence 
in the United States.  Imagine a military commander needing 
probable cause to detain—or worse, some higher level of proof 
to attack—an enemy!36  The implications are mind-boggling to 
 
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/July/08-opa-633.html. 
34. Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680, 2739-44 (2005). 
35. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Gerald Neuman, The 
Extraterritorial Constitution After Boumediene v. Bush, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 
259 (2009).  See also Implications of the Supreme Court‟s Boumediene v. Bush 
Decision for Detainees at Guantanamo Bay: Before the H. Armed Services 
Comm., 110th Cong. (2008) (testimony of Neal A. Katyal, Professor, 
Georgetown University Law Center) (opining that the entire Constitution 
applies to Guantanamo, not just the habeas provision), available at 
http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/FC073008/Katyal_Testimony073008.pdf. 
36. Practically speaking, commanders conduct a per se probable cause 
analysis when, under the Laws of Armed Conflict, they evaluate a target, 
including whether it is a lawful military target and whether there is a lawful 
military purpose to attack.  This process and the resulting decision, while 
quite formalized, are neither designed nor intended to be introduced as 
evidence in a federal court. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/16
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a military professional.  Our military force would essentially be 
converted into a de facto law enforcement organization or 
would have such an organization as its adjunct.  Such 
extension would completely change the face of combat.37  
Perhaps some of these examples are far-fetched; the issue, 
though, is how far toward this end will the courts go?  They 
should go no further than Boumediene.  If, however, courts 
continue the trend and extend this holding, how would the DoD 
meet these new requirements? 
Programmatically and institutionally, extension would 
require a re-evaluation of the DoD’s policies, regulations, 
training, and organization.  Currently, all military personnel 
are trained to the Geneva standard under the DoD Law of War 
Program.38  This program ensures that service members are 
trained in and abide by the international legal norms of 
warfare.  Would the DoD implement a similar program to 
ensure compliance with domestic laws during combat 
operations, including detention operations?  And, if so, should 
it be separate from the Law of War Program or integrated into 
it? 
A progressive extension of Boumediene may require service 
members in combat to abide by constitutional provisions 
normally applicable to domestic law enforcement personnel.  
Such an extension would require a massive training and 
education program to be implemented department-wide.  This 
training might include instruction on the court-directed 
domestic laws that might now be applicable, essentially a 
shifting body of criminal law for the battlefield.  In 
 
37. A fundamental question regarding the use of military force in 
counterterrorism operations is which law applies.  Specifically, do traditional 
law enforcement rules apply, or do the laws of warfare apply?  This question 
is discussed in detail in Gregory E. Maggs, Assessing the Legality of 
Counterterrorism Measures Without Characterizing Them as Law 
Enforcement or Military Action, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 661 (2007) (arguing that 
neither a law enforcement nor a military framework applies but, rather, a 
unique counterterrorism paradigm). 
38. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Dir. No. 2311.01E, DoD Law of War Program 
(May 9, 2006), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d2311_01e.pdf.  
This directive implements measures to ensure DoD compliance with the laws 
of war as detailed in international agreements, primarily the Geneva 
Conventions. 
9
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implementing this new standard, both the DoD and the 
military might be required to implement several new 
procedures, including: training packages for new entrants at 
basic training installations, annual refresher training, 
formalized procedures for integration into major military 
training exercises and actual military operations, a reporting 
procedure for violations, and benchmarks for methods of 
effectiveness.  The International Committee of the Red Cross 
(“ICRC”) might choose to monitor U.S. forces not only for 
compliance with international law but also for compliance with 
our applicable domestic laws.  The DoD would be interested in 
the ICRC’s new focus area and would need to implement 
procedures to address these new areas of international 
scrutiny. 
As the DoD attempts to operationalize Boumediene, it 
must consider the new concept of how to support a federal case 
while concomitantly conducting military operations.  Justice 
Scalia, in his dissent, noted that the Boumediene holding “sets 
our military commanders the impossible task of proving to a 
civilian court, under whatever standards this Court devises in 
the future, that evidence supports the confinement of each and 
every enemy prisoner.”39  Practically speaking, this is already 
happening in the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia as the Guantanamo detainees’ habeas cases 
progress.40  The Supreme Court is not, as Justice Scalia noted, 
establishing the rules under which these cases will proceed.  
That task has fallen on the district court judges, specifically 
Senior Judge Thomas F. Hogan, who has been charged with 
establishing general rules for the administration and 
management of most of these cases.41 
 
39. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2307 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
40. Judge Thomas F. Hogan issued a Preliminary Consolidated 
Management Order on November 6, 2008 and a Consolidated Management 
Order on December 17, 2008, which detail common procedures for most of the 
habeas cases.  In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., Misc. No. 08-0442, 
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97095 (D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2008); In re Guantanamo Bay 
Detainee Litig., Misc. No. 08-0442, 2008 WL 5275914 (D.D.C. Dec. 17, 2008). 
41. Press Release, United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia, DC Chief Judge Meets with Judges to Discuss District Court 
Procedures for Guantanamo Cases (July 2, 2008) [hereinafter DC District 
Court Press Release], available at http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/public-
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/16
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These rules and procedures will be vitally important not 
only for the process, but also for the DoD and combat soldiers 
whose actions they will dictate.  Courts will create, and lawyers 
argue endlessly about, such important matters as the definition 
of “enemy combatant,” the standard of proof for this yet-to-be 
defined term, the admissibility of evidence, the scope and 
breadth of exclusionary rules, presumptions afforded to 
government evidence, whether the presence of the detainee is 
required, access to government witnesses, the extent of 
government disclosures of exculpatory evidence pursuant to 
Brady v. Maryland,42 and a host of other procedural and 
substantive issues.  Every issue that may arise in a federal 
criminal case will have to be addressed, interpreted, decided, 
and applied to the current and future unique enemy prisoner 
habeas actions.  These procedures create daunting tasks. 
Enter CSI: Kandahar.  Extending the Boumediene holding 
would require detailed procedures for the collection, 
preservation, and maintenance of “evidence.”  Normally, the 
military treats information regarding enemy captives as 
battlefield information or intelligence.  Military personnel 
process this information, important to the conduct of military 
operations, through intelligence channels.  Intelligence 
analysts and commanders use the information to determine 
enemy strengths, weaknesses, vulnerabilities, and locations 
important to the commander on the ground.  Treating captured 
enemy information as evidence in a federal case would require 
an entirely new method of collecting and processing 
intelligence.  More likely, the DoD and the intelligence agencies 
would choose to establish an entirely separate but parallel 
system to process and sanitize battlefield intelligence 
information for transmittal to federal courts because of the 
significant risk to intelligence sources and methods. 
The DoD may be forced to address these federal evidence 
requirements.  Standards may have to be established, 
beginning with procedures to determine what constitutes the 
 
docs/system/files/Guantanamo-PressRelease070208.pdf; In re Guantanamo 
Bay Detainee Litig., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97095; In re Guantanamo Bay 
Detainee Litig., 2008 WL 5275914. 
42. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
11
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equivalent of probable cause to detain, and including 
procedures for, inter alia, the seizure and collection of evidence, 
chain of custody, evidence storage and maintenance, evidence 
authentication, and witness availability.43  This may, in turn, 
require procedures to formalize investigations, including a 
requirement of a pseudo-criminal case file for every detained 
enemy. 
Certainly, service members do not have the training to 
make and prove a federal case.  Service members on the ground 
are now familiar with basic evidence collection requirements, 
and great strides have been taken in Iraq and Afghanistan to 
formalize information collection resulting from raids.44  Site 
exploitation teams and specially trained personnel have 
assisted in gathering and maintaining site intelligence 
information, which may later be used as evidence, normally in 
an Iraqi or Afghani court.  But imagine if every military 
operation required a police-like crime scene analysis, with the 
 
43. These concerns are not unfounded.  In arguing evidence procedures 
and standards before Judge Richard Leon in the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia, detainee counsel argued, among other things, that the 
standard of proof to determine whether a detainee is in fact an enemy 
combatant should be the criminal conviction standard of beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Judge Leon ordered the lesser standard of proof by a preponderance of 
the evidence.  Boumediene v. Bush, No. 04-1166 (D.D.C. Aug. 27, 2008), 
available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/08/leon-
case-manage-order-8-27-08.pdf.  Moreover, the U.S. District Court for the 
District of South Carolina addressed this issue of standard of proof in the 
case of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.  Hamdi, a U.S. citizen, was captured as an enemy 
combatant in Afghanistan, transferred to Guantanamo, and moved to the 
Naval brig in Charleston, South Carolina after it was determined that he was 
a U.S. citizen.  He sought habeas review.  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 
510-11 (2004) (plurality).  The district court determined that he was entitled 
to habeas review and that he was entitled to have the government prove his 
status by a heightened standard of proof.  Id. at 511-16.  The U.S. Supreme 
Court reversed the latter part of this holding.  Id. at 531-33.  One 
commentator described this heightened standard initially imposed by the 
district court as, indeed, the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.  Terry Gill 
& Elies van Sliedregdt, Guantanamo Bay: A Reflection on Legal Rights and 
Status of „Unlawful Enemy Combatants‟, 1 UTRECHT L. REV. 28, 42 (2005). 
44. See, e.g., Capt. Robin Worch, IA Learns Evidence Gathering From 
Cavalry Troops, TASK FORCE MOUNTAIN, Aug. 12, 2007, http://www.taskforce 
mountain.com/stories/5-stories/316-20080813-p3-1 (describing efforts by U.S. 
troops to train the new Iraqi Army on evidence collection procedures to assist 
in criminal prosecutions). 
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collection of evidence to be used in a federal court.  Soldiers 
simply cannot conduct such an undertaking, nor should they be 
required to. 
Military law enforcement personnel are a limited asset on 
the battlefield, busily investigating alleged misconduct by 
military personnel, contract fraud, and the deaths of service 
members.  The DoD would be hard pressed to meet new 
stringent investigative and evidentiary requirements.  The 
DoD may have to adjust its force structure and dramatically 
increase the capacity of the services’ law enforcement 
investigative agencies, a precarious undertaking for a military 
already stretched thin.  Or, perhaps the DoD would create a 
new habeas investigative agency, uniformed and/or civilian, to 
accompany forces on the battlefield.  One solution is to use 
another federal law enforcement agency, such as the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (“F.B.I.”), to augment military forces, 
similar to the manner in which the U.S. Coast Guard augments 
U.S. Navy operations during law enforcement actions at sea.45 
In addition to programmatic and organizational 
challenges, the DoD may be forced to consider Boumediene in 
the planning and execution of military strategy in particular 
theaters or on specified operations.  The DoD would likely take 
necessary steps, perhaps in consultation with the Department 
of State, to ensure that functional control does not attach as 
war plans are drafted and executed.  The DoD may desire, for 
example, to be invited into a theater of operation, as opposed to 
conducting a forced entry; to have time-specific “stationing” 
agreements in place with the legitimate or proxy authority, 
trumpeting the sovereign authority of the host nation (or, at a 
minimum, a similar unilateral proclamation from the host 
nation); to have a United Nations Security Council Resolution 
(“UNSCR”) or similar pronouncement from an international 
organization, containing language disavowing United States 
 
45. See 10 U.S.C. § 379 (2006) (requiring U.S. Coast Guard personnel to 
be assigned to Navy vessels in order to conduct law enforcement—including 
drug interdiction—operations).  See also CTR. FOR LAW & MILITARY 
OPERATIONS, DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 206 (2009) (noting that 
the Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment unit actually assumes 
constructive command of the vessel during the conduct of the law 
enforcement operation). 
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functional control; or to avoid declaring, or taking cumulative 
actions amounting to, United States functional control. 
Consider detention operations themselves and the prisoner 
of war/corrections conundrum that would ensue.  A new 
paradigm for battlefield detention, temporary holding, and 
transfer to permanent internment facilities may be necessary.  
Detaining enemy fighters may become a risky endeavor, from 
the perspective of ensuring compliance with new yet uncertain 
legal norms or in seeking to mitigate litigation risk.  The DoD 
would need to formalize specific guidelines, perhaps a set of 
Standing Rules of Detention Operations.  Military corrections 
facilities and guards currently exist, but not in the scope or 
breadth that would be required with an extension of the 
Boumediene holding.  More practically, will military guards be 
required to provide these detainees with televisions, a law 
library, and other privileges determined by our courts to be 
constitutional rights of inmates in U.S. prisons? 
Clearly, facilities and leases similar to Guantanamo Bay 
would be avoided.  The DoD may, however, be cautiously 
inclined to establish detention agreements with a host nation.  
For an Army of Occupation, where the risk of a functional 
control determination is greater, the United States may 
desire—whether through Congressional action, treaty or 
international agreement, or simple memoranda of 
understanding—to effectively cede functional control of 
detention facilities to the occupied nation, a third nation, or an 
international body.  In some scenarios, it may not be 
operationally wise or safe to transfer prisoners in a war zone to 
a third party, particularly one less capable of operating and 
defending the facility.  And, for the same reason the United 
States may pursue this agreement, third parties may seek to 
avoid it, or else risk a political backlash or a wave of detainee 
counsel seeking to meet with clients and file countless habeas 
actions on their behalf.  Our coalition partners certainly are not 
interested in conducting—much less managing—battlefield 
detentions of enemy fighters. 
Further, the “take-no-prisoners” mantra is unacceptable, 
whether viewed from a national, organizational, or individual 
perspective.  Unfortunately, some commentators and pundits 
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who have decried Boumediene have either endorsed a take-no-
prisoners policy or at least predicted that one will eventually 
come into being.  A policy of taking no prisoners, either express 
or implied, can never be an option for a civilized nation or its 
citizens and service members.  The DoD must emphasize that 
such an approach, whether created intentionally or through 
benign neglect, is unacceptable.  To achieve this goal, the DoD 
will need to establish procedures, a training program, and an 
evaluation mechanism to avoid a “take-no-prisoners” 
organizational tone from taking hold. 
The DoD is not the only entity affected.  An extension of 
Boumediene would require a substantial investment of other 
federal resources not previously required for a war effort.  
Federal courts and the Department of Justice will bear a huge 
load under such an extension.  Both the federal court system—
specifically the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia—and the Department of Justice have already taken 
exhaustive post-Boumediene measures to handle the relatively 
few cases currently coming out of Guantanamo Bay.46  The 250 
or so habeas cases from Guantanamo Bay detainees pale in 
comparison to the potential tens of thousands that could be 
filed by prisoners if Boumediene is extended.47  Without major 
changes to meet such a scenario, judicial resources would be 
overwhelmed.  Further, the impact of this decision on the 
separation of powers and an independent executive branch is 
uncertain, and beyond the scope of this discussion. 
In summary, from a department-wide perspective, the DoD 
is in the untenable position of having to conduct a war and plan 
for future engagements in an uncertain legal landscape.  
 
46. See, e.g., Mukasey, Remarks at the Meeting of the American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, supra note 33; DC District 
Court Press Release, supra note 41. 
47. For an example of the impact on one agency, the DoD, see Dell’Orto, 
supra note 4.  Mr. Dell’Orto indicates that the future implications of 
Boumediene, should it be extended, would have a “crippling” effect on the 
DoD.  Id. at 7.  The tremendous strain of these 250 cases will also affect, and 
indeed has already affected, numerous other agencies.  For the District of 
Columbia cases alone, the Court, the DoD, law enforcement, intelligence 
agencies, and other agencies were required to devote substantial assets, 
standing up Guantanamo teams to assist in processing information for the 
court and parties. 
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Whether any DoD personnel have or will have functional 
control over detained enemy personnel is not a question easily 
answered but one that must be formally addressed, so that 
troops on the ground can operate effectively and in compliance 
with the law. 
 
III. Boumediene in Bagram and on the Battlefield 
 
Boumediene, and the potential extension of its holding, 
impacts U.S. detention operations not only at Guantanamo Bay 
but also at Bagram and other current or future detention 
facilities.  As a preliminary matter, the natural question in 
light of Boumediene is how necessary or beneficial is 
Guantanamo Bay?  If the DoD initially established 
Guantanamo Bay for its foreign location—more convenient for 
U.S.-based intelligence and interrogation personnel—then, in 
light of Boumediene, the base is no longer “foreign.”  The 
purported freedom from domestic legal requirements initially 
presumed at Guantanamo no longer exists.  As the current 
administration seeks to close Guantanamo48—whether due to 
legal, political, or policy reasons—it is clear that Boumediene 
has done away with at least one benefit of housing detainees at 
Guantanamo. 
Could Boumediene impact current detention activities in 
Bagram?  If Boumediene reaches that facility, the Eisentrager 
Court’s worst fears would be realized.49  Military interrogations 
 
48. See Memorandum on Directing Certain Actions With Respect to 
Acquisition and Use of Thomson Correctional Center To Facilitate Closure of 
Detention Facilities at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, 75 Fed. Reg. 1015 (Dec. 
15, 2009).  See also Charlie Savage, Delay Expected on Illinois Plan for 
Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2009, at A1 (reporting that officials believe 
Guantanamo Bay will be closed by 2011 at the earliest). 
49. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 779 (1950).  The Court 
stated that: 
 
Such trials would hamper the war effort and bring aid and 
comfort to the enemy.  They would diminish the prestige of 
our commanders, not only with enemies but with wavering 
neutrals.  It would be difficult to devise more effective 
fettering of a field commander than to allow the very 
enemies he is ordered to reduce to submission to call him to 
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might require court approval, or worse, the presence of a 
detainee’s counsel.  Moving a detainee may likewise require 
approval from the court.  Conditions of confinement might be 
reviewable by a court.  Military prison guards may be liable to 
their enemy captives in constitutional tort.  The implications, 
again, are vast. 
In addition to detention operations in a theater of war, 
Boumediene may directly impact actual day-to-day combat 
operations.  Justice Scalia warned that Boumediene could 
“cause more Americans to be killed.”50  Practically speaking, he 
was referring to a situation where a court releases a terrorist 
who returns to fight against Americans.  Additionally, 
battlefield impact and risk to service members for other 
reasons is not improbable. 
As a preliminary matter, the issue arises in determining 
when habeas rights attach.  Habeas would attach on the 
battlefield only if the United States exercises functional control 
over a combatant—that is, if it exercises the functional 
equivalent of legal sovereignty over the detainee.  In a country 
like Afghanistan, or even Iraq, there is no question that 
functioning governments active in inter- and intra-state affairs 
are operating, and the nations maintain their sovereignty.  But 
does (or would) the United States operate in a pocket or 
umbrella of sovereignty in either nation for purposes of 
Boumediene?  Liberal stationing agreements, UNSCRs, or 
other documents authorizing or defining the scope and breadth 
of authority for U.S. forces in a country could be read to grant 
Boumediene-like autonomy.  During the heightened occupation 
of Iraq, and the initial invasion of Afghanistan, a stronger 
argument could have been made that habeas in fact attached to 
 
account in his own civil courts and divert his efforts and 
attention from the military offensive abroad to the legal 
defensive at home.  Nor is it unlikely that the result of such 
enemy litigiousness would be a conflict between judicial and 
military opinion highly comforting to enemies of the United 
States. 
 
Id. 
50. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2294 (2008) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
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in-country detentions.  And, in a certain area of occupation, 
such as post-war Germany, or immediately following invasive 
hostilities, the case is again much closer. 
If a U.S. soldier operates in a pocket of sovereignty, habeas 
rights may attach to any enemy he seizes or captures on the 
battlefield.  Those rights would remain during temporary 
detention, transfer, and long-term detention.  In this (hopefully 
unlikely) situation, U.S. combat troops would have to be 
trained in the latest version of habeas law for the battlefield.  
They would need to know not only the operational 
requirements and details of the military operation—for 
example, seizing terrain or raiding a compound—but also the 
legal niceties associated with capturing an enemy who has 
constitutional rights and seizing the evidence that might be 
necessary to keep that enemy in detention and off of future 
battlefields.  At the very least, these new requirements would 
be a distraction to an undertaking where focus and attention to 
detail are vital, a distraction that could be deadly. 
Essentially, troops on patrol would be carrying the full 
panoply of rights and privileges afforded under the U.S. 
Constitution in their assault packs.  Every enemy encountered 
would be entitled to rummage through the pack to choose the 
U.S. domestic law—the legal weapon51—to use against the 
soldier.  In effect, the military operation would be converted 
into a pseudo-law enforcement search and seizure operation.  
U.S. combat troops would be no different than police officers on 
patrol in any town or city in the United States.  The military 
would cease to exist as we know it and would become nothing 
more than a deployable F.B.I. 
As indicated above, evidence experts and/or law 
enforcement experts may be integrated into the operation.  
These individuals are likely not familiar with military 
operations and have not trained with the unit to which they 
would be assigned.  The potential for confusion, hesitation, 
mistaken identity, and uncertainty is great.  Each creates a 
recipe for fratricide, enemy advantage, or worse—mission 
failure and defeat. 
 
51. The Court in Eisentrager called this “placing the litigation weapon in 
unrestrained enemy hands.”  Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 779. 
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Intelligence operations will be the most vulnerable.  If 
court-directed discovery occurs, a unit’s intelligence files would 
become the equivalent of a law enforcement investigative file.  
Information deemed relevant to the defense, including 
information that the United States expended significant 
resources, and potentially lives, to obtain, would become 
discoverable in some form.  Valuable intelligence sources and 
methods, some irreplaceable, would be lost.  Sources would dry 
up or perhaps be revealed and killed. 
Consider the sad and dangerous contradiction.  Military 
planners and intelligence officers study and analyze an enemy, 
compiling tens of thousands of pieces of information into a 
precise operations plan, targeted at important leaders or 
facilities.  Troops receive an order, conduct mission-specific 
training, and prepare to execute.  Approvals are obtained from 
appropriate commanders.  A joint and multi-national combined 
arms operation ensues to attain the military objective sought.  
Conventional troops, special operations forces, combat aircraft, 
artillery support, and overhead assets all converge on the 
target in a dangerous and complex culmination of modern 
military power.  Enemy, friendly, and civilian lives are lost, 
and prisoners are taken.  Specialized teams exploit the site and 
sweep through the complex, retrieving valuable enemy 
information that will assist in future operations and save 
American lives.  Now the contradiction is revealed.  All the 
information relevant to a federal court case—information 
gained in the planning, execution, and exploitation of the 
mission—is transmitted back to a U.S. court, to counsel, and, 
perhaps, back to the same enemy captives who required so 
much time, effort, resources, and lives to capture.  This truly is 
a sad and dangerous contradiction.  Soldiers will have risked 
their lives to regurgitate the fruits of their sweat, toil, and 
blood back to the enemy.  This example illustrates why 
Boumediene must stop at Guantanamo Bay. 
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IV. Conclusion 
 
Strikingly, in the penultimate paragraph of his dissent in 
Boumediene, Chief Justice Roberts asked “who has won?”52  
The apparent answer is that no one wins.  Not the detainees, 
as Chief Justice Roberts wrote, for they are left “with only the 
prospect of further litigation to determine the content of their 
new habeas right.”53  Not the U.S. Congress, as its role in 
legislating “has been unceremoniously brushed aside,”54 and 
not the “Great Writ,” (the Writ of Habeas Corpus), as it has 
been relegated to application at some “jurisdictionally quirky 
outpost” known as Guantanamo Bay.55  Forebodingly, Chief 
Justice Roberts concludes that two other more important 
entities have also not won: 
 
[And] [n]ot the rule of law, unless by that is 
meant the rule of lawyers, who will now arguably 
have a greater role than military and intelligence 
officials in shaping policy for alien enemy 
combatants.  And certainly not the American 
people, who today lose a bit more control over the 
conduct of this Nation’s foreign policy to 
unelected, politically unaccountable judges.56 
 
In a Boumediene environment, military personnel would 
know that essentially every prisoner is a federal case.  The 
federal court would, in a real sense, be there on the battlefield 
too, dictating the conduct of military operations.  If Boumediene 
were applied to the battlefield, plans, procedures, and military 
tactics would undoubtedly change.  In an environment where 
the United States exercises functional control, the Boumediene 
protections, and perhaps even more domestic legal protections, 
would apply to detained personnel.  But in the traditional 
battlefield environment, where the United States does not 
 
52. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2293 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
53. Id. (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
54. Id. (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
55. Id. (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
56. Id. (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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exercise functional control, it would be business as usual for 
our military forces.  The DoD (or a court) would conduct the 
functional analysis, and soldiers would know, in theory, during 
the planning stages and execution of a mission, whether 
habeas rights lie with the enemy they may detain.  In the 
worst-case scenario, the military planners would make the 
wrong decision on whether functional sovereignty lies with the 
United States.  The result is, essentially, Guantanamo all over 
again—a painful and untenable situation not only for the 
military but also for the executive branch and the court system 
that may have to hear the cases. 
Soldiers know the business of seizing and holding terrain, 
and it is difficult enough to fight a war against an enemy that 
ascribes to and follows the Geneva Conventions.  Fighting 
against terrorists who openly disregard the Conventions, 
behead prisoners and kill civilians is even more daunting.  
Extending Boumediene to the battlefield makes a difficult 
military situation even worse.  On a spectrum of negative 
repercussions, extending Boumediene is the practical 
equivalent of placing a pile of rocks into a soldier’s already full 
rucksack; tauntingly and spitefully laughing in the face of 
service members who have risked their lives on dangerous 
missions, not to mention the friends, family, and a Nation 
whose loved ones were lost on those missions; and giving the 
enemy, on a legal silver platter, former captives to return to the 
fight or valuable intelligence information with which to kill 
more Americans.  The impact and effect would be felt from the 
highest levels of the DoD, to theater commanders, to 
commanders on the ground, to soldiers in the field executing a 
mission, and to a regretful Nation.  Boumediene should not and 
cannot be extended. 
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